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This study is concerned with the causality of systematic
communication errors encountered in Marine land combat
operations in Vietnam. Source data was compiled from an
examination of after-action reports maintained at USMC
Archives, Washington, D. C. The fundamentals of
Information and Communication Theory are explored first, in
an effort to understand the phenomena (psychological and
physiological capabilities and limitations) affecting the
"human link" in information and communication systems. This
background served as the foundation regarding the
development of a communication error model to explain the
anomalies encountered in human behavior in military
operations of high intensity. From this model, inferences
were made regarding the practicality of implementing
Decision Support System's (DSS»s) to eliminate the
systematic communication errors discovered.
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Mar, as Karl von Clausewitz stated in his great treatise
indited over 150 years ago, is a complex phenomenon that
touches every science and draws from them all. In addition
to encompassing machines, weapons, strategy and tactics; the
Laws of War must consider the psychological aspects and
physiological limitations of individuals. These
conclusions, drawn from von Clausewitz's personal
examination of past and imagined future battles are accepted
as universally applicable, as they reflect typical elements
regarding the main problems a commander must consider in
military operations. The recognition of these latter two
factors of war on the modern battlefield requires particular
attention in view of the increased demands placed on the
individual by technology, and the high absolute value
inherent in most decisions executed in a combat environment.
B. HYPOTHESIS
The general hypothesis underlying this research was that
a large number of unsuccessful land combat operations could
be attributed to systematic errors committed by the human
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components in communication systems. (Systematic errors were
defined to be those that occur regularly in human
communication links) . Although communication systems entail
both a hardware and a human element, consideration of the
former was disregarded due to the prolific research already
accomplished in this area. (Available studies reflected a
proclivity by analysts to measure overall system success
strictly as a function of hardware performance)
.
The Vietnam War generated an extensive amount of
battlefield information, much of which has never been
analyzed. Data on information and communication has been
especially neglected. In view of this, it was hypothesized
that an examination of a random sample of after-action
reports (historical narratives summarizing operation) would
isolate human, organizational and situational variables
which adversely affected human information processing
abilities. These variables, imputed upon individuals
working under the degraded conditions of the battlefield,
would in turn generate systematic communication errors
contributing to, or resulting in, failed missions. For the
purpose of this analysis, mission failure was measured in
terms of the absolute error (i.e failed operations.

sustained casualties) inherent in the final outcome of all
decisions.
C. PURPOSE
The purpose of this study was threefold.
1 . Communication Errors
Errors can be system, design or human induced. In
view of this, the first step in learning to communicate more
effectively is to determine exactly what types of errors
exist. As such, a random sample of after- action reports was
analyzed in order to isolate and categorize those variables
(actions, situations, events) which were associated with or
contributed to systematic communication errors encountered
in land combat operations. These variables were extracted
from operations classified as failures within the sample,
after examining the associated information content,
interpretation and flow contained therein. The specific
intent was to identify the antecedent conditions and
resultant consequences associated with the recurring
communication errors.
Whereas most research emphasized specific instances
of communication errors, this study concentrated on
identifying systematic or recurring errors. Furthermore, if
10

the occurence of these errors could be explained in terms
information and communication systems, they could also be
corrected.
Although it is recognized that the effective and
efficient operation of any system is a function of both
equipment and operator performance, the specific issues
addressed here were the capabilities and limitations of the
human in information and communication systems in a combat
environment. Specific issues focused upon were attitudinal
and behavioral phenomena associated with humans in
communication systems. As such, this study was concerned
with human and system induced errors, as the design induced
errors (i.e. faulty equipment) were considered
noninteresting and had already been extensively researched.
2. Communication Model
After conducting the study to determine exactly what
systematic errors are present, an effort was made to
construct a communication model to explain the causality of
communication errors discovered in land combat operations.
The specific intent here focused upon the premise that a
suitable model would make the users within the
communications system more cognizant of the variables
11

affecting optimal system performance (for the given
situation) .
3. Decision Support Systems Applications
Following these two objectives, an effort was made
to determine the impact a Decision Support System would have
with regards to alleviating or eliminating these errors. As
the efficient and effective operation of any Decision
Support System is a function of individual, organizational
and environmental phenomena; the specific intent here was to
determine the practicality of implementing a Decision
Support System in view of the errors discovered and model
developed.
D. SCOPE
One of the major tenets in any comparative study of
human capabilities and limitations is that performance
ceilings should first be established under optimal system
conditions, followed by degraded performance limits under
less than ideal conditions. As such, a condensation of the
exhaustive research conducted in the fields of information
and communication theory is presented first. This material
reflects the components contributing to optimal human
performance in each system. It is in turn followed by
12

examples of degraded performance in information and
communication systems experienced by troops operating in
Vietnam. These examples were drawn from the wealth of
material covering Marine land combat operations in Vietnam
daring the years 1965-1972 inclusive. From this population
was drawn a random sample from which the inferences
contained herein were made.
E. LIMITATIONS
The reader is assumed to have limited knowledge of the
human dimension in information, communication and decision
support systems. Additionally, expertise with Marine land
combat operations is not required as examples of
communication errors discovered will be presented on a
conceptual versus fundamental basis. In view of this, a
framework will be laid for both information and
communication systems to include the human dimensions
inherent in each. This will enable the reader to more fully
appreciate the conclusions drawn from the sample to follow.
F. METHODOLOGY
During the course of the war, a series of post
operational or after-action reports (lessons learned) was
generated to inform commanders of high risk tactical
13

procedures which were believed to contribute to avoidable
combat casualties. Due to the duration of the war,
political considerations and foreign intervention, the
Marines experienced a dynamic role reversal in their basic
mission during its most formidable years (from a limited
defensive strategy to a dual strategy which involved
conducting simultaneous offensive and pacification
operations) . During this period, thousands of combat
missions were executed of different natures and intensities
by various size units (reconnaisance patrols through
Battalions) . As such, the table of random numbers contained
in Degroot [Ref. 1 ]. was utilized to select a random sample
of over 150 operations and after-action reports for
examination covering these years. Given that the table
contained 9999 four digit random numbers, and that
after-action reports were cataloged alphabetically, each
operation was selected by choosing a number in the table,
and sequentially matching the first two digits to a letter
in the alphabet, and the last two digits to the
corresponding report numbsr in the file. This was
accomplished to preclude unnecessary bias from entering the
sample regarding the type and frequency of communication
14

errors encountered as a function of time, nature of
operation, and size of engaged units. In short, during the
period 1965-1972, all operations by all size units were
subject to scrutiny. From this sample, inferences were made
regarding recurring factors which contributed to
communication errors resulting in nonessential casualties or
failed missions.
G. APPROACH
Due to the nature of land combat operations, any
Decision Support System implemented therein would require
heavy investitures in communication systems. As such, this
analysis progresses through three systems of various natures
and differing degrees of complexity.
As an overview, a brief synopsis of Marine land
operations in Vietnam will be presented first. This will in
turn be followed by a discussion of information and
communication systems respectively. Following this, a
listing and analysis of systematic errors committed in
Marine land combat operations in Vietnam will be presented
to be followed by the development of a communication error
model. This discussion will be concluded by integrating the
findings discovered above, with the characteristics of
15

Decision Support systems in an effort to determine the
latter's usefulness with regards to alleviating or




Marine involvement in this nation's most recent and
protracted war began with the introduction of a single
Marine advisor into Vietnam in 1954. The first Marine
tatical unit deployed to Vietnam in April 1962 as evidenced
by the arrival of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362
(HMM-362). Buildup of Marine air and ground units started in
March 1965 with the arrival of the 9th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade. This buildup resulted in the evolution of the III
Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) which eventually attained
a peak strength of 85,755 Marines in September 1968. It was
not until the Saigon evacuation on 9 December 1972 that the
last Marine was withdrawn from Vietnam.
During the war's peak years (1965-1971), approximately
730,000 men and women served in the Corps; 500,000 of them
serving in Vietnam. During the years 1 January 1961 through
9 December 1972, combat casualties sustained by Marines
operating in Vietnam included:
1. Killed in Action (KIA) : 12,936 (28. H% of 45,915
U.S. total)
.
2. Killed (non-battle): 1,679.
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3. Wounded in Action (WIA) : 88,589 including 55,389
requiring hospitalization (33. 5% of 153,256 U.S. total).
These statistics garnered from FMF historical summaries
[Ref. 2] reflect that the engagement billed as the "nation's
nightmare" in the '60*s, represented the greatest U. S.
military commitment since WW II (The Marine's personnel
commitment and combat casualties actually exceeded WW II
figures) . The United States withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972
generated a series of ex post facto reports postulating
different authors views criticizing various facets (i.e.
communications, logistics, tactics...) of military
operations which were believed to have contributed to a
significant number of nonessential combat casualties. The
critiques for the most part took a microcosmic view of
military operations as they emphasized factors such as
faulty weapons, poor maintenance procedures and unreliable
communications hardware. These evaluations failed to
recognize that the total success of a system is determined
by environmental factors affecting the performance of men as
well as machines.
At the other extreme, S.L.A. Marshall reckoned that at
one point in the War: "about one third of our losses in
18

action were our fault, owing to carelessness" [Ref. 3].
Although the impact of these factors on some otherwise
avoidable casualties is recognized, examination of a sample
of after-action reports reflect that the human dimension was
a major contributing factor to systematic communications
errors in many instances. As recognized by Clausewitz in
the 18th century, War has a human as well as a hardware
element. And if war is to be conducted successfully, this
factor must be accounted for on today's battlefield,
especially as it relates to such critical components as
information and communications systems.
Historically, not enough attention has been directed at
this facet of warfare. In particular, communications has
been described as a passive element of land warfare as it
does not contribute to the neutralization or destruction of
the enemy. Its aim is not the excision of the enemy from an
area, but rather the uncompromising flow of information to
and from units directed at "compelling our adversary to do
our will". [Ref 4]. As such, it has never been placed on
the asset side of the balance sheet, which has resulted in
superficial scrutiny of the causality of communication
errors when they did occur in land warfare engagements. The
19

proclivity of analysts in the past has been to attribute
these errors to hardware failures, improper training, lack
of education, etc..., when infact more latent phenomena may
be the principle contributing agent.
If communication errors are ever to be completely
eliminated in a system, all contributing agents as to their
occurences must be accounted for to include the human
element (psychological, physiological and behavioral
characteristics of individuals). Once this is accomplished,
only then can an effective Decision Support System (DSS)
relying heavily on communications be designed for, and






The basic contention of information theory is that
information's primary purpose is to reduce the amount of
uncertainty (i.e. event that is probabilistic but where the
parameters are unknown) present within an organization or
system. The functioning of an information system can be
described by the second law of thermodynamics, which states
that any open system (no energy input) over a period of time
will tend toward a state of maximum entropy (positive
measure of randomness or disorder) . As such, the amount of
information required b y an organization to maintain a given
level of performance (order) is directly dependent upon the
entropy present within a system. For the greater the
entropy surrounding an organization (i.e. combat unit), the
greater is the demand for information as reflected by the
number of transmitted messages. This demand for information
serves to reduce the associated uncertainty (unavailable
information) , thereby prompting order and enabling the
organization to maintain control.
21

Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety addresses this issue
quantitatively by stating that the internal communication
capacity (amount of information transmitted and received)
within a system must be no less than the turbulence of the
environment surrounding it if the system is to maintain
control. Thus, organizations finding themselves in
"friendly" environments (low turbulence) , have little or no
uncertainty and therefore require a minimal amount of
information to maintain control.
At the other extreme, organizations such as the military
may find themselves in highly turbulent environments, and
should therefore be heavy investors in information
processing systems. Mechanisms employed in such systems
directed at coping with a high degree of uncertainty
include:
1. Coordination by Rules: increases the information
processing capabilities of an organization by allowing
inter-unit activities to transpire without communications,
but is applicable only in those situations which can be




2. Coordination by Goals: reduces information
processing requirements by specifying goals to be achieved
by all participants. The intent of this procedure is to
reduce the amount of coordination (information transmitted)
required to keep all units abreast of the situation and on a
common course of action.
3. Hierarchy: is used to increase the information
processing capabilities of an organization when coordination
by rules or goals is not applicable; and as such,
"situations are referred to that level in the hierarchy
where a global perspective exists for all affected
subunits". [Ref. 5]. The danger inherent in this mechanism
however, is that due to the pyramidical structure of
vertically integrated organizations, the decision point may
eventually become overloaded.
Of the three mechanisms utilized to increase the
information processing capabilities of a system, the latter
is most applicable to a military organization engaged in a
combat environment. Reliance upon the first two mechanisms
is limited due to the dynamic role reversals experienced by,
and time constraints imposed upon, units engaged in combat.
The third mechanism is not without its shortcomings however,
23

as the examples illustrate it is subject to biases peculiar
to information transmitted between two different hierarchal
levels.
B. SPECIFIC
Information is data (familiar to both the source and the
receiver) that has been processed into a form that is
meaningful to the recipient and is of real or perceived
value in current or prospective decisions. As treated in
this context, information is a resource that has utility by
reducing the uncertainty within an organization provided
that it is timely, accurate and relevant. Supporting this
ar-gument is the fact that not all communicated information
reduces uncertainty. To be of value, information must
elicit the desired interpretation, response, or action from
the recipient (decision-maker) . As such, information must
be conveyed to the recipients in such a manner so as to
enhance its use in operational situations. This implies that
a selective filtering of information must occur prior to
transmission in order that the sender may tailor the message
to the enviornment, task at hand, and capabilities of the
decision-maker. This tailoring serves to accomodate the
human whenever he is viewed as an information processor.
24

Besides being saddled with the routine information
processing duties not involving human cognition (reception,
storage, retrieval) , the individual may be required to
execute more complex cognitive assignments (judgement and
decision-making) . The succsssf ul execution of these latter
two information processing tasks is especially critical in
noisy (information not intended by the source) environments,
as their outcome may determine the long term survival
propects of an organization. To ensure the correct
perceptual distinction is made for each, it is imperative
that only relevant information is conveyed to the recipient,
in order to elicit the intended response. As humans have
ceilings regarding their ability to process the amount and
rate of information, communicating superfluous stimuli will
result in sub-optimal performance once the individual's
threshold is exceeded. In view of the limited capacity of
humans, caution must therefore be exercised to ensure that
the "selective sample" of information communicated to the
individual prompts the appropriate response. Condensation




The method for transmitting (visual, auditory, or
tactile) information is also critical, as some have
intrinsic advantages over the others depending upon the
environment. Given that in land combat operations messages
are usually short, simple and deal with events in time,
extensive research has proven that an auditory method of
information transmission is the most appropriate. This
determination is also supported by the fact that many
messages call for immediate action (i.e. on-call fire
support, resupply...) , and by a person required to move
about continuously. The bearing these factors have on the
implementation of Decision Support Systems will be seen
later.
In summary, the effecti7e communication of information
serves to change the probabilities associated with expected
outcomes in a decision situation, highlighting the intimate
nature of information, communications, and decision theory.
C. CHARACTERISTICS
Information may be characterized by:
1. Quantity
Quantity is concerned with how much of the original
message is received, as there exists man-made restrictions
26

and human constraints placed upon the amount and rate of
information that may be effectively communicated to an
individual. Thus, some degree of "data compression" is
mandatory if information is to be transmitted error-free
between human components of a communication system,
a. System/Organization Induced
"Tailoring stresses the effective and timely
communication of information (of the correct quantity and
quality) to the decision- maker. As such, tailoring is a
concerted effort by the sender to make the message user
compatible to the task at hand. The type, amount rate and
construct of information is therefore transmitted with
respect to the operating environment and capabilities
(skills, knowledge, experience) of the recipient.
The amount and type of information furnished to
a decision-maker is a function of his relative position in
the organizational hierarchy. Applying the tailoring
concept, when communicating upward in a hierarchy,
information about the internal environment (control-
oriented) should be condensed while information about the
external environment ( planning-oriented) should be
amplified. For information communicated downward within the
27

hierarchy, the reverse is true. These actions are mandatory
due to the nature (strategic and operational respectively)
of decisions required by individuals occupying the upper and
lower echelons in a hierarchy. Conformance to such
procedures is especially critical in a military
organization, where rank determines the level of vertical
integration of an individual within a unit. The position
one occupies in the hierarchy should therefore be considered
prior to transmission to ensure the free exchange of
information. This practice not only recognizes the
structure of an organization, but the inherent capabilities
and limitations (i.e. skills, experience, knowledge) of
individuals occupying different decision points within the
structure. The impact of a decision by an individual
occupying a seat at the apex of the pyramid, is therefore
far more reaching than a decision executed by an individual
occupying the base of a hierarchically structured
organization
.
Redundancy (increasing the total information in
the system over a particular period of time) is an means
that may be employed in either of the transmission
modalities above, and serves to minimize information loss
28

whenever channel noise (distortion, interference) is
present. However, besides being grossly inefficient, this
practice does not lend itself for implementation in a
military environment, in view of the severe time, security
and channel capacity constraints associated with military
operations.
b. Natural
The amount and type of information correctly
received and interpreted by an individual is subject to the
psychological limits as described by Miller [Ref. 6].
Additionally, stress, strain and fatigue have particularly
deleterious effects on the ability of a receiver to
effectively function as a decision-maker when in receipt of
pertinent information.
2. Quality
Quality is concerned with whether or not the
received message conveys the intended meaning of the
transmitted message. This implies minimal relevant
information loss or modification during transmission. As
such, quality is affected by errors and biases introduced
during the transmission or interpretation of a message
respectively. With regards to biases, they originate due to
29

the perceiver responding to unknown cues. If biases can be
detected, their correction is a simple mattar of adjustment.
Errors on the other hand are more subtle to detect and
difficult to correct. The presence of errors as well as
biases in information will be examined in Chapter 4 with
regards to their impact on communication systems.
3. Effectiveness
Effectiveness implies eliciting the desired
impression or response from the recipient. As such,
information is considered to be effective if it:
1. informs - changes ths probabilities of a choice
2. instructs - changes the efficiencies of a course of
action
3. motivates - changes the values of the outcomes [Ref.
7]. '
Thus, the effective transmission of information
reduces the uncertainty thereby enabling the decision-maker
to determine an appropriate course of action for the
situation at hand. Effectiveness is therefore dependent
upon the degree of tailoring by the sender, as it exists
only of the correct individual, receives the correct
information at the correct time. Effectiveness is also
30

intimately related to the functional approach definition of
communication to be discussed later.
In view of the aforementioned, information can be
characterized by three components (quantity, quality and
effectiveness) and a variety of attributes (timeliness,
accuracy, relevancy...)* Information has utility or value
only when it serves to reduce the uncertainty of the
decision-maker for a particular situation. The basic
functions of an information system entail determining the
recipient's needs, selecting and tailoring available
information, and communicating this information to the user.






As surmised by Clausewitz nearly two centuries ago,
"Lines of communication form the connection between the army
and its base, and are to be considered as so many great
vital arteries. These life channels must therefore neither
be severed nor interfered with,... as some strength is always
lost,... and the army may grow feeble and die away" [Ref. 8].
Although today's communications encompasses a host of
activities (radio, telecommunications, satellite
transmission...) never envisioned by Clausewitz, his basic
premise holds true in that the communication of information
remains the life stream of all organizations.
Communications in combat occupies a particularly
precarious position as it is oftentimes required under
seriously degraded environmental conditions (battlefield
noise, exhausted personnel) , and as such, there exists
peculiar situational and human variables attempting to sever
it. A military commander must therefore recognized and
control these variables if he is to ensure a continuous and
current flow of information to/from his satellite units.
32

Once this is accomplished, effective and timely decisions
can then be communicated to subordinate leaders.
As such, communications is the one common denominator
that enables a combat organization to become a coordinated
and responsive fighting unit. And if functioning properly,
it serves as a synergetic mechanism by integrating the
actions of individual men and weapons into a formidable
tactical unit.
B. SPECIFIC
The purpose of communications is to inform the recipient
about a situation in which he has no contact in order to
elicit a particular response. This reults from the fact
that all relationships between humans involve some form of
communication. And as such, it is a factor that must be
reckoned with for every human problem encountered in the
working environment. It is regarded as the principle
driving force behind most organizations, and is particularly
critical to those experiencing a great deal of turbulence or
uncertainty. To recapitulate the comments of the previous
section, the greater the uncertainty, the greater is the
demand for information. This in turn requires accurate
communication to ensure the correct people, get the correct
33

information, at the correct time, in crder for an effective
decision to be reached. This decision however, has no value
in and of itself, as it must be communicated to others in
order to be acted upon. From a global perspective then,
information, communication and decision theory and systems
are interrelated.
Having first examined information theory, communication
theory will now be discussed in an effort to determine the
causality of communication errors discovered in land combat
operations in Vietnam. These results will then be
integrated with the two aforementioned theories in an effort
to construct a communication error model (analog or
representation) to be considered in the design and
implementation of a Decision Support System for land combat
operations.
Communication is most often thought of as the exchange
of information between two parties. This information is
transmitted via a channel between a sender and a receiver
during which it is subject to a host of environmental
influences which may alter the quantity and quality of the
original communique. However, understanding and evaluating
communications and its associated problems is not that
simple as the following viewpoints (approaches) reflect.
34

Individuals in the era that spawned the term the
"nation^ nightmare", are also credited with coining the
phrase "communications gap". Although this latter term has
been abused, it still remains a source of considerable
consternation. Only recently has it come under intensive
scrutiny, for it has finally been recognized that the time
and effort it takes to ensure a communication is initially
understood, is far less costly than straigtening out a
misunderstanding, particularly in high intensity situations.
One of the agents contributing to today's communication
problems has been the dilemna of agreeing upon a common
definition for the term "communication". For if
communication is defined in different ways, errors
encountered therein are also evaluated in different ways,
some of which may be completely irrelevant with regards to
explaining the problem at hand. Lin [Ref. 9] collated the
most common definitions of communications into the following
approaches to include his own.
1 . Definitions
a. Elemental Approach
This approach is probably the most widely
recognized
, as it attempts to specify communication systems
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in terms of its structural components (elements) . It
resembles electrical engineering models, by introducing
"noise" into a channel carrying a message between a*'
transmitter and a receiver. It also highlights the fact
that communication is a two way interactive process, as the
role of the sender/receiver is a reciprocal relationship as
a rule rather than the exception.
b. Process Approach
The process approach takes a cognitive view of
communication systems. It attempts to explain their
effectiveness as a function of balanced or unbalanced states
as determined by a person 1 s attitude toward a source and an
issue, and the perceived assertion of the source about the
issue. When each of the components of the process approach
is considered as the corners of the triangle, binary values
can then be assigned to each side of the triangle as a
function of the states between two corners (i.e. balanced
state = 1, unbalanced state = 0) . Algebraic- multiplication
of the three sides will yield either a balanced (effective)
or unbalanced (ineffective) communication system. Thus,
only one, or all of the sides must be balanced to ensure an
overall balanced system. When the configuration is
36

unbalanced, balancing occurs only through actions or








Essentially, this approach defines communication
simply by specifying the function the message serves (i.e.
informational, instructional, motivational) .
Myriad other attempts have been made to define
communications adding to the confusion with regards to its
study. These attempts define communications as everything
from a "learning process" to the question of "Who says what
in what channel to whom with what effect"? Obviously these
latter definitions do not lend themselves toward effective
analysis, and therefore, the communication errors discovered
will be analyzed in teems of the three principle
definitions. Each approach presents a different perspective
regarding the role of humans in communication systems, and
as such will be called upon to explain the problems
discovered therein. Before proceeding however, one novel
approach to the definition of communication bears attention.
d. Conceptual Approach
Lin [Ref. 10] has integrated the
aforementioned definitions of communications into an all
encompassing conceptual framework that focuses upon the
human interactions aspects of communications. It is
38

concerned with more than a mathematical explanation
(systematic relationship in the quantity and quality of
information between input and output) as it focuses upon
attitudinal and behavioral phenomena associated with
efficient and effective communications. As such, Nan Lin
attempts to maximize the vantage points from which human
communications and its associated errors can be viewed. It
consists of the four phases described below.
(1) Encounter . This is the first phase of the
human communication process and focuses on the linkage
between a specific piece of information (and the receiver)
and the transmission medium. Its fidelity is therefore a
function of both information and delivery systems.
(a) Information System:
With regards to the information system, to be of
value, information aiust be novel and comprehensible (easily
encoded and decoded) if it is to reduce uncertainty and be
considered worthwhile. These factors have particular
relevance in military operations where individual and unit





With regards to the delivery system. Nan Lin
states transmission is affected by the:
1. Noise introduced by the source, receiver , channel
or environment, as human transmissions do not as a general
rule occur under perfect (noiseless) conditions.
2. Channel capacity being exceeded. This implies that
when the sender and the receiver have different transmission
capacities, the lasser of the two cannot be exceeded if
communications are to be successful. If this
encoding/decoding differential is not recognized, redundancy
must be employed to compensate for information that would
otherwise have been lost. (Difficult to do in combat) . This
factor bears particular attention given the age, experience
and educational differential inherent in the hierarchical
interpersonal relationships in the military.
3. Spatial Network such that the frequency of
interactions among people is inversely related to the
physical distance between them. Research here has proven
that while closer physical space usually promotes
interpersonal communication, it can also generate problems
if taken for granted (i.e. carelessness). This phenomena
may help to explain the cause for "not passing the word".
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4. Social Network such that the amount and direction of
communication flow is a function of ones
societal/hierarchical status. As a rule, low-status
individuals initiate communications with high- status
subjects more frequently than the reverse. This bears
particular relevance in the types of systematic errors
discovered as a function of the directionality of
communication flow.
(2) Exchange . Exchange is the next phase in
human communication and entails a concerted effort on the
part of the sender and receiver to share and understand the
transmitted message. Thus, the participants attempt to
respond to each others messages.
(3) Influence . The third tenet in Nan Lin's
view of communication states that the communication source
exerts some effect or influence over the receiver. This
influence may affect either of two dimensions of the human
profile as either his psychological (attitudinally oriented)
or behavioral (action orieQted) perspective or response
respectively on a particular issue in a particular situation
may be altered as a result of his participation in encounter
and axchange. Nan Lin explains this phenomena by stating
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that influence may be defined as "the discrepancy between
(a) a persons attitude toward an object or situation, or
his behavior patterns, before his voluntary or involuntary
participation in encounter and/or exchange and (b) his
attitude or behavioral patterns after such encounter and or
exchange" [Hef. 11 ]• Note the emphasis is on the term
behavioral pattern as opposed to behavioral incidents.
Although many diversified theories have
been postulated to explain this phase, they all focus upon
"the change as expressed (attitude) or performed (behavior)
by the receiver from communication" in a particular
situation [ Ref . 12]. Behavior is defined to be an overt
gesture, acted or spoken whioh is verifiable by others.
(4) Adaptation and Control . Adaptation and
control serves as a cybernetic, mechanism which prevents the
communication system from deteriorating. To accomplish this
task, feedback is utilized to establish a two way flow of
communications (as the first three phases were concerned
with unidirectional flow) between the source and the
receiver. Specifically, negative feedbak is used to inform





Human communication is classified according to the
level of analysis (number of people involved and direction
of flow) under survey.
a. Intrapersonal
First and foremost comes intrapersonal
communication which focuses upon the cognitive processes
within the individual. This facet of communication has been
determined to be the bridge between an individual and his
behavior, and is the chief concern of psychologists and
socialogists. Nan Lin states that this is process that
enables a person to "come to grips with himself" (i.e.
become a social being) by viewing himself objectively and
responding to stimuli as he would expect others to respond.
As we shall see, this process may override the following
classes of communications.
b. Interpersonal
Interpersonal communication occurs between two
or more individuals. Associated with this type of
communication is the reciprocal relationship between sender
and receiver which pervades most systems. Problems
U3

encountered in this type of interaction are the chief
concern of this study.
c. Societal/Mass
Societal/Mass communications involve a
significant number of individuals affected by a certain
communication media (TV, newspaper) with no interactive
exchange of information. This classification will not be
considered in this discussion.
2. Roles of Humans
As described by Campbell [Ref. 13], humans can
assume two different roles in a communication system, each
of which has inherent systematic errors. He emphasizes that
if these biases can be recognized as being likely to occur
in particular situations, they can be compensated for. And,
if their existence is not recognized, ineffective
communications will persist.
a. Duplicatory Transmitter
The simplest and most common role a human
assumes in a communication system is that of a duplicatory
transmitter. His role while functioning in this capacity is
to merely relay information without a change in form.
Despite the triviality of this task, it generates the most
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errors. This results from the fact that a human employed in
this manner must encode, call memory, and decode information
asynchronously (as Dpposed to a machine which conducts these
operations synchronously). In view of this, such operations
are more suited for machines than men.
b. Reductive Coding
The other major activity a human performs in a
communication system is reductive coding. His primary
function here is to "collapse" a complicated input signal
into a simpler and more comprehensible message that has
relevance with regards to making decision. Due to the
greater complexity associated with this task, more and
different systematic errors surface when the human is




This section highlights the systematic errors most
frequently encountered during the course of the research.
For ease of reference, related incidents are considered
collectively and classified under their most easily
identifiable characteristic (i.e. action/event transpiring
at time of communication failure) . Specific incidents of
communication failure for each category are listed for
illustrated purposes only. Additionally, the principle
causes and effects of each type of communication failure are
enumerated.
1. Medevac Requests:
Some of the most costly (measured in terms of sustained
casualties) incidences of failed communications occurred
during "coordinated" Marine air-ground missions,
particularly those involving helicopter operations
supporting air medevac (medical evacuations) requests. It
was not uncommon for the ground commander to transmit the
medevac request and then change frequencies to monitor and
control ground operations. As a result, coordination
between the responding helicopter commander and on-scene
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ground commander was impossible due to the latter's failure
to maintain communications on the designated frequency
(ground commander preoccupied with ground communications)
.
Despite the lack of communications the dispatched
helicopters oftentimes attempted to fulfill their missions
blindly, by entering the LZ's (landing zones) without
knowledge of the essentials (wind speed and direction; zone
obstructions, markings and security...)* Although it was
recognized that these missions usually took place under
hostile conditions, 1st MAW statistics [Ref. 14] reflected
the severity of the problem, as although medevac missions
accounted for only 7.5% of the total number of helicopter
missions, they accounted for 32& of total crew casualties.
2. Fire Support:
Whereas communication failures during medevac operations
resulted in casualties, communication failures during fire
support operations resulted in unfulfilled missions. Two
recurring types of errors were discovered.
First, there were numerous instances noted where mission
failures could be attributed solely to the lack or mismatch
of a piece of a highly utilized piece of "hardware" - a
shackle sheet (coded sheet used to decode an encoded
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transmission). This problem surfaced primarily when mission
requirements dictated communications between independent but
supporting units (reconais sance, infantry, artillery , . ..)
.
For example, intra-Battalion errors of this nature were not
noted, however, inter-unit (i.e reconaissance patrol and
artillery battery) activities tended to generate these
occurrences. This oversight resulted in many lost targets
of opportunity.
Secondly, mission failures oftentimes resulted form
inordinate delays associated with fulfilling safety (i.e.
confirming danger close limits and/or save-a-plane requests)
and control (obtaining permission to fire) requirements.
When the communication required to effect action was finally
received, it was "history" as opposed to "news" (relevant
information) . Thus, fleeting targets were again lost before
supporting arms could be brought to bear.
3. Natural:
After entering thick vegetation and losing contact with
their supporting unit, many patrols prematurely aborted
their mission and returned to base as per SOP. It was later
discovered however, that little or no consideration was
given to the limitations placed upon communications
4 8

equipment by the operating environment. Had communications
personnel been more experienced and knowledgeable of the
basic fact that dense foliage absorbs radio waves thereby
seriously impairing the normal operating ranges (of FM
radios operating in the VHP band), many patrols could have
continued their mission by moving a short distance from the
dead space they were currently in and reestablishing
communications.
4. First Aide:
Probably the most recognized and costly (as measured in
terms of nonessential casualties) incidences of
communication failures occurred at the small unit level when
engaged in the attack. Despite repeated commands from
individual leaders, Marines repeatedly ignored them to rush
to the aide of an injured Marina. Besides disregarding the
immediate orders of a superior, Marines were also violating
lessons learned (dispersion, laying base of fire) during
basic training. This proclivity to aide injured Marines
instead of following orders contributed to a significant
number of nonessential casualties as:
a. it reduced their outgoing rate of fire (thereby
encouraging the enemy to increase theirs) resulting in a
loss of momentum paricularly during the attack phase.
49

b. undispersed Marines afforded a larger and more
lucrative target to the anemy. The costs associated with
these actions were seriously aggravated by the enemy's
employment of area explosives (grenades, mortars...)*
Thus, each incapacitated Marine contributed to a
synergetic affect enjoyed by the enemy. (i.e. single




Marines also exhibited a tendency to break fire
discipline during intense operations despite repeated
instructions to the contrary. Consequences of these actions
resulted in many failed missions as positions were
compromised, the element of surprise was lost and an
inordinate amount of ammunitions was expended. These
actions contradict those experienced by soldiers in WW II
(as S.L.A. Marshall discovered that weapons were not fired
despite orders to do so) and reflects that in the "heat of





One common burden shared by small unit leaders {platoon
and company commanders) upon contact with the enemy was the
lack of accurate, systematic and timely reporting of contact
with the enemy to higher headquarters. Because of other
on-site demands (i.e. orchestrating fire support
coordination and manuever on the battlefield) placed upon
the unit commander, the reporting of contacts was oftentimes
delayed or ignored. These unintentional communications slip
oftentimes served to aggravate an already serious situation
such as either receiving late or not receiving at all
resources requested from but controlled by higher
headquarters ( fire support, medevacs, logistics...).
7. Passing the Word:
Keeping oneself and everyone else around oneself informed
was the most common communication dilemna encountered.
Countless daily incidents occurred whereby "passing the
word" was not accomplished. The consequences of these
communication failures were innumerable preventable
accidents (attributed to ignorance, inattention or
carelessness), resulting in failed missions, serious injury
and death. As mentioned earlier, the gravity of this
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situation was recognized by Marshall who believed that
one-third of the combat casualties could be attributed to
carelessness
.
The importance of keeping everyone informed was
particularly important because once a single link was
severed, "snowballing" occured as every uninformed member
was now subject to becoming the innocent victim of his own,
or his buddy f s ignorance of the situation.
Representative examples of these types of communication
failures included repeated incidences of shooting other
patrol members while on missions in jungle terrain. For
example, a patrol leader may have changed the patrol
formation (from a double column to a "V") without all the
members receiving word. When activity to the front and sides
was later detected, forward patrol members were shot by
uninformed members comprising the rear guard.
Other common occurrences of a similar nature involved
sentries shooting patrol members returning to friendly lines
through their area of observation (as they never received
word of the time and place of the patrols return as per SOP,





It was noted that there existed situations and/or
tendencies whereby a subordinate deliberately, tailored his
responses to a senior. As an example, it was not uncommon
for a subordinate to respond to a POSREP (position report)
confirming that he was at a certain position (i.e. LZ,
checkpoint, objective...) at a certain time, when in fact he
was still short of his destination.
These actions at times served to jepoardize the success
of a mission and safety of individuals (i.e calling fire





The intent of this chapter is to;
1. isolate the common denominator (s) which explains (in
terms of information and communication theory) the occurence
of each event or situat ionally triggered communications
error described above.
2. make practical recommendations as to how these types
of errors can be avoided in future military operations.
3. construct a communications model (incorporating all
of the common denominators) which serves to predict the type
of communications errors to be expected or considered when
communicating in a particular situation.
A. CATEGORY I
Communication errors associated with the presence of the
first three events or situations (medevacs, fire support and
natural environment) are uninteresting with regards to
explaining their occurrence in terms of information or
communication theory. Although the effects (number of
casualties or failed missions) of these communication
failures were not trivial, their causes were. The principle
agents contributing to each communication failure can be
explained in terms of:
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1. lack of coordination during medevac operations
2. oversights with regards to communication
requirements (shackle sheets)
3. redundancy and/or overcontrol inherent in fulfilling
safety requirements (danger-close, save-a-plane request)
4. lack of knowledge and/or experience resulting in the
communicators inability to correlate their radios operating
characteristics (capabili tiss and limitations) with the
operating environment.
In view of the aforementioned, and for the sake of
future discussion related to DSS applications, the
contributing agents to Category I communication errors will
be considered as being partially "structured" in nature.
B. CATEGORY II
The remaining communication errors can all be explained
in terms of the information and communication theory
previously discussed. As all have subtleties associated
with their occurrence (accounted for in terms of
attitudinal, behavioral or cognitive phenomena) , they will
be considered as "unstructured" types of communication
errors. The "justification" for the occurrence of each of




On the surface, this action appears as nothing more than
a direct disobedience of an order (DDO) . Its occurrence
however is predicted by both Herman's work [Ref. 15] and Nan
Lin's Conceptual Approach to communication theory. Together
they state that deviations in behavior may be triggered when
attitudinal conflicts develop in particular situations.
They also assert, that given the proper situation (to
generate such conflicts) , the resultant deviations can be
categorized into behavioral patterns as oppossed to isolated
behavioral incidents. Nan Lin also insists that although an
individual may participate in encounter and exchange, he may
still not be influenced by it due to the situation. He
further stipulates, that atypical behavior may result
despite the presence of amplifying phenomena (i.e. rank
structure, doctrine engrained in basic training,
self-preservation) which usually serves to reinforce the
communicated message.
Heider [Ref. 16] also supports these contentions through
his Process Approach, by asserting that any attempts at
communication will fail if unbalanced states exist within
his framework (i.e. source and receiver do not share the




The observed communication failures are considered as an
intrapersonal event. The antecedent conditions causing them
to surface result from an unconscious reordering of the many
attitudes which transpires as a function of the situation.
Therefore, for every event, each attitude is unconsciously
"weighted" or reassessed with regards to other attitudes in
the "attitudianal hierarchy". Thus, in some situations an
individual may rank his attitudes higher toward a peer than
toward a senior (under normal circumstances, the opposite
would be expected). Additionally, as attitudes and behavior
are normally directly correllated (i.e. common exception:
racial prejudice where a person's behavior does not
necessarily reflect his attitude), an individual's behavior
will reflect his "deviant" attitude toward the situation
(i.e. rescuing buddy versus obeying orders of superior).
Once the situation passes (i.e. aide rendered), another
reranking of attitudes may then occur resulting in more
normal behavior.
The crux of the issue is that different situations
activate a different set of rank-ordered attitudes, and if
an undesireable reordering (known to commonly occur) is to
be prevented in given situations (also known) , the desired
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attitude must be more deeply engrained in the individual
before a potential attitudinal and behavioral altering
situation occurs.
Research has shown that the most effective way to
accomplish this is through training, whereby individuals are
advised of the importance (and consequences) of maintaining
(not maintaining) a given attitude in a given situation.
Unless this indoctrination occurs, experience has shown that
communication failures will continue to occur despite
concerted efforts to prevent them.
The excessive costs (nonessential casualties) associated
with the widespread occurrence of this phenomena in Vietnam
were recognized. Efforts to alleviate the problem however,
did not meet with much success. This fact leads one to
speculate on the extra number of nonessential casualties
that would be sustained should women ever be allowed into
combat (given the protective nature of the male)
.
2. Fire Discipline:
The -contributing agents to communication failures
associated with this activity are much the same as discussed
above. This fact illustrates that although repeated
failures of unit leaders to maintain control was widely
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noted under such circumstances, repeated efforts (training,
briefings) to compensate for such communication failures
were unsuccessful. These actions may illustrate the fact
that their exists particular situations where emotions take
over, and any attempts to influence individual behavior or
action through communications may prove ineffective.
3. Overload:
Miller [Ref. 17] explained this issue by stating that
there exists learned, natural (i.e. electrical/chemical
processes limit a human to 2 active-cognitive
decision/second) and absolute ("magical number 7") phenomena
affecting the human's information processing abiltiy and
capacity. If any of these limits are taxed (common in
intense situations) , communication errors result due to
omitting, transposing or garbling essential pieces of
information. This implies that there is a limit placed upon
the amount and rate that information may be effectively
processed by an individual. And as total capacity
increases, accurracy decreases. The stipulations contained
in paragraphs VLB. 1.7 5 8 also support this contention.
Aggravating this phenomena, is the fact that maximum
information processing effectiveness is achieved when
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information is arranged in logical progression. In the
combat arena however, information is usually communicated in
chronological progression.
In summary, there exists an upper limit upon which the
receiver can match responses to input stimuli. And if the
amount and rate of information content and flow cannot be
altered, then another receptor must be employed to relieve
the information processing burden.
Research has proven [Ref. 18] that message processing is
greatly influenced by battlefield events and individual
activity. During critical portions of a mission (the
attack) , severe task overloading occurs which results in the
deletion or deferral of many duties. Thus, when actively
engaged, a commander may acknowledge receipt (encounter) of
a message and then subconsciously place it in a "memory
queue" to be extracted later when the situation allows.
Upon retrieval, he may forget or alter its contents, or find
it required immediate attention or action (at the time of
reception) and is no longer relevant to the situation at
hand.
Even though communications with higher headquarters
normally requires the individual attention of the "actual"
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(on-scene commander) , III MAF recognized the burden placed
upon the unit commanders and recommended that other
individuals be trained and employed in communications to
higher headquarters. This action was instituted to reduce
communication errors with the peripheral benefit of allowing
the individual unit leader to more appropriately focus his
attention on the situation at hand.
Ill SAP's recommendation during the Vietnam War should
be seriously considered with regards to any future Marine
engagements. Given the projected nature of the operations
and advances in weapons and communication systems
technology, the communication demands placed upon the
individual commander will continue to increase.
4. Passing the Word:
This inter-unit activity is best described by Campbell
[Ref. 19] in his view of the human as a
duplicatory- transmitter in a communication system.
With regards to information theory, both the quantity
and quality of information suffer when the human is employed
in this capacity. From a communications theory perspective
however, the principle concern is the noise entering the
medium with each exchange. Thus, faulty transmissions can
be expected in similar activities due to:
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1. fewer details included in each exchange.
2. details are changed (added, reweighted. . .) .
3. inference being made by one link and subsequently
decoded as facts by another link.
4. middle message loss in lengthy transmissions.
5. property of closure - tendency of individuals to
fill gaps in messages based upon prior knowledge,
experiences and prejudices.
6. STM (Short Term Memory) - on an average an
individual heavily engaged in other activities (receiving
constant and varying input) can accurately hold a message in
memory for approximately 30 seconds. Furthermore, research
has proven that in this span, an individual can retain no
more than seven digits within his immediate memory (i.e.
seven digit phone number takes this fact into account)
.
7. "Magic number 7" - depending upon the situation and
irregardless of all other considerations, some messages may
be just too complex for transmission if they contain too
many (greater than seven) "pieces" of information. Research
by Miller [Ref. 20] supports this contention as he
discovered that an individual can expect to get (with any
degree of accuracy) no more than 7 bits of output from 7
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bits of input. This assertion coincides with previous
findings reflecting that the human attention span is limited
to 7 objects. Thus, if complex messages must be
transmitted, and are to be accurately interpreted they must
either:
a. stimulate more than the audio sense (i.e.
visual; for example, the implementation of a DSS would
fulfill this action)
.
b. include redundancy, as repeating something
twice has been discovered to increase retention on an
average of 15% (although this action is inefficient and
impractical in a combat environment given the time, security
and channel capacity restrictions inherent in combat
operations)
.
8. current beliefs influencing what we hear. This
factor reemphasizes the requirement to keep informed as any
new information (either not familiar to, or shared by) will
be resisted (property of inerita) , rejected or twisted by
the recipient.
9. closeness in proximity of each link to one another
may actually prevent word from being passed on as the
current recipient oftentimes perceives that the next
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individual in the link has heard the message intended for
himself (i.e. Inevitably, if "Pass it back" is given in a
column formation, there are usually several members in the
rear who never receive "the word")
.
10. the generally accepted limit (to ensure accurate
transmission) in human exchanges is three. As such,
transmitting a message through a squad (13) or a platoon
(42) is inviting disaster.
Although all of these variables have a marked effect on
efficient communications in these types of situations, the
impact of the latter two may be the most pronounced, yet
least recognized. Research has proven that these variables
can be eliminated from communications if:
1. Chains of Command are utilized more often to pass
the word (i.e. reduces total number of exchanges to inform
the same number of people) .
2. feedback is employed (i.e. communication should be a
two way activity as opposed to a unidirectional channel) as
it tells the source if and what information has been
communicated to the receiver.
3. the transmitter (usually a senior) exercises a sense
of empathy toward the recipient (subordinate) . At this
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point it should be noted that the Vietnam conflict was this
nation's first teenage war (age of average soldier less than
20 years). This fact requires some attention, as a senior's
ability to effectively communicate with subordinates at
their level (in recognition of age, experience,
background...) bears particular attention in view of the
nonrepresentative sample of youths (larger percentage are
teenagers, minorities, uneducated and poor than in the past)
entering today's Armed Forces largely due to the AVF and
state of the economy. These factors must be recognized as
what we hear is largely a function of the frame of reference
in which we are operating. And if they are not matched, any
attempt at establishing' effective communications in any
situation will fail.
5. Inaccurate Reporting:
The occurrence of this practice is accounted for in
research conducted by both Campbell [Ref. 21] and Manis
[Ref. 22]. They discovered that in interpersonal
communications where a senior- subordinate relationship
exists, the transmitter may deliberately distort his
communication to please the receiver. The degree of
distortion is amplified even further in those situations
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whereby the recipient exerts a great deal of influence
(power, authority, charisma...) over the source.
Consistent with these findings, was the fact that such
occurrences were noted only in situations where
communications transpired between two different levels in
the military hierarchy (Company/Battalion) . This can be
explained by the fact that communications with superiors are
usually more deliberate than exchanges among subordinates
(which are usually spontaneous) . Its appearance in a
military environment is therefore not surprising given the
heavy emphasis placed upon rank structure.
Manis [ Ref . 23] best summarized this phenomena by
stating that "the innocent bearer of bad tidings may well be
punished and may eventually learn that the safest course is
to systematically bias messages (within limits) so that they
are minimally offensive to listener (s) ".
Campbell [Ref. 24] explains this behavior in terms of a
motivational issue and appeasement mechanism. He asserts
that a source may be so enamored with a recipient, that he
will be motivated to "selectively shape" his output so as to
make it congruent with the views of his sponsor.
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It is generally believed that the best prevention
against "half-truths" is to surround oneself with reliable
people (who's word can be taken at face value). However, it
should be recognized that virtually anyone is susceptible to
such deviation, particularly in highly competitive or
intense situations.
C. ERROR MODEL
I would like to extend Weissinger-Baylon's and
Tonnison's communication error model which defines
communications in terms of the elemental approach.
Empirical research supporting its formulation is based
primarily upon studies conducted in civilian occupations
which depend heavily upon communication systems (i.e. ATC)
.
As such, it addresses those situations or occupations
characterized by interactions among single senders and
single receivers of essentially the same status.
My extension proposes that a taxonomy of combat induced
errors can be constructed as a function of the relative
direction of communications flow in the military hierarchy.
Specifically, the type, frequency, and causes of
communication errors are largely determined by the relative
position (senior, contemporary, subordinate) of the source
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to the recipient. This approach also serves to recognize
and/or reinforce the :
1. dimensional approach to the definition of
communications.
2. organizational process view of decisionmaking (to be
discussed latter)
.
3. heavy emphasis placad upon structure (i.e. rank,
units) by the military.
In view of the aforementioned, the 8 systematic errors
discovered can be categorized into 3 different hierarchical
groupings as follows.
1. Communications to Subordinates
a. First Aide
b. Fire Discipline
2. Communications among Contemporaries
a. Passing the Word








The communication errors included in the first two
categories (exchanges among subordinates and peers) can be
explained in terms of information and/or communication
theory. As discussed earlier, research findings in the
cognitive, attitudinal or behavioral sciences support the
occurrence of these types of errors in related situations.
For example, communication errors associated with the first
task (first aide) can be explained in terms of the
conceptual definition of communication, as well as
attitudinal and behavioral phenomena. All three errors are
labelled under the more general heading of Category II
errors.
Errors in communications directed at seniors however,
were previously sorted as either Category I or Category II
errors. The first two errors (marginal reporting and
overloading) associated with communications to superiors can
be classified as Category II errors as there exists
attitudinal and behavioral phenomena explaining their
occurrences.
The other errors however, could not be explained in
terms of systematic errors or biases inherent in information
and/or communication systems. As such, they are classified
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as Category I errors as their occurrence can be attributed
to "procedural shortcomings". Our concern is with the




VII. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
A. GENERAL
Historically, computers were used to increase the
efficiency as opposed to the effectiveness of a function.
Today's technology (hardware, software, interactive
capability...) however, has advanced to the point where
computers can now support individual operations (i.e.
managerial activities) as opposed to functions (i.e.
accounting). As such, Decision Support Systems represent
the natural evolution of computer based technology to assist
an individual in performing a particular task.
DSS^s are based upon the premise that more effective
decisions can be reached (and tasks executed) if those
portions of the decision bsst accomplished by man (i.e.
judgement, intuition) and machine (i.e. computation) are
executed separately, and then integrated to arrive at a
common decision. This approach focuses upon balancing human
and computer resources by ensuring the computer enhances (as




According to Keen and Scott-Morton, "a DSS implies a
conversational interactive computer system with some form of
terminal for the analytical power, models and data bases
held in the machine" [ Hef . 25], Furthermore, they assert
that the following three activities are the principle
purposes of Decision Support Systems.
1. Assist individuals in their decision process in
semi-structured tasks.
2. Support managerial judgement.
3. Improve the effectiveness as opposed to the
efficiency (implies a time and cost minimization) of the
decisions.
In view of these assertions, Keen and Scott-Morton
contend that a DSS may prove expedient in the following
situations.
1. Manipulation is required of a data base too large for
individual conceptualization.
2. Computation is required to arrive at a solution.
3. Time constraints exist to arrive at the final answer.
4. A judgement requirement exists to determine the
problem, evaluate alternatives and choose a solution.
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To recapitulate, they state that "a DSS provides a
coherent strategy for going beyond the traditional use of
computers in structured situations while avoiding
ineffectual efforts to automate inherently unstructured
ones'1 . [F.ef. 26].
Before proceeding to the military applications of
Decision Support System's, the following peripheral issues
relating to DSS's should be addressed.
1. DSS's focus upon semi-structured decisions or xasks.
As a matter of perspective, structured decisions involve
repetitive and routine determinations that can be resolved
exclusively through the execution of an existing algorithm
(i.e. EOQ) . Unstructured decisions (associated with
intuition, turbulent environments, judgement...) are either
currently unprogrammed or incapable of being programmed, and
therefore rely soley upon human cognition for solution.
Semi-structured decisions involve those decisions or
tasks that can be neither completely automated, nor reached
as a function of human cognition alone due to the
scale/complexity of the problem. As such, varying degrees
of subjective human assessments and objective computer
determinations are involved depending upon the situation.
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2. DSS components includes men, computers and
information. It will therefore be only as strong as its
weakest link, as the effectiveness of any decision depends
upon the information system, human cognition and "insight"
offered by the computer.
3. DS is concerned with constructing a system to support
the key decisions or tasks associated with a specific type
of operation. As such, supportable tasks (semi-structured)
must first be identified to include partioning the decision
process into structured (objectively oriented and computer
implemented) and unstructured (subjectively oriented and
human implemented) components. The DSS must then be
designed commensurate with the appropriate decisionmaking
school of thought (i. e . rational, satisficing,
organizational, political, individual differences)
.
4. After determining the decisions, the information
requirements (source, frequency, currency...) needed to
support different types of decisions (strategic,
operational, managerial) must be addressed. The crux of
this isssue is that more reliable, accurate and timely
information improves the quality of any decision. And as





To understand the potential applications of DSS in
combat operations, it should be noted that in order to
survive in a hostile environment, effective (vice efficient)
decisions and actions need to be executed. This tenet
implies that the implementation of a DSS in combat
environments is particularly relevant, given that a DSS's
expressed purpose is to improve the effectiveness of
decisions for certain tasks.
Analogous to this issue is the fact that a hostile
environment increases the demand for information, which in
turn increases the demand on communication systems. This
activity oftentimes serves to generate communication errors,
many of which contribute to mission failures or disasters.
In view of the characteristics of a DSS, it is also asserted
that the implementation of the same will alleviate or
eliminate many of these errors.
As the design of any DSS is primarily task dependent, an
analysis of the tasks it may be required to perform is in
order.






2. firepower, to include
a. target acquisition
b. massing of fires
3. communications
Additionally, the successful execution of any one of
these activities is further complicated during coordinated
air-ground missions peculiar to the USMC.
In view of the scope and diversity of these activities,
it is imperative to establish and maintain reliable
communications (so that information may be received and




Thus, the nature of the task and decisions to be
performed during land engagements clearly illustrate the
potential benefits to be gained by the implementation of a
DSS in particular operations.
As their are differing points of viaw regarding the
mechanices of decisionmaking (and therefore the criteria
considered in designing a DSS) , consideration must be given
to peculiarities associated with the three principle
components of a DSS employed in military environments.
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First, information can be classified as tactical (i.e.
fire support requests) , non-tactical (i.e. logistic requests)
or intelligence (i.e. enemy, environment) . Each class is
unique in that although all three may come from a single
source (ground commander) , they are rarely directed at a
single recipient (channeled to respective staff or special
staff Officers)
.
Additionally, they are updated continually (with
information internal and external to the organization) , and
generally transmitted between units on different levels in
the military hierarchy. Thus, a DSS implemented in related
environments may be required to access several constantly
changing data bases thereby increasing the degree of
complexity of the system.
Secondly, the military structure, nature of operations
and span of control dictates that many decisions will be
executed at one level and implemented at another (by
subordinate unit) . This practice illustrates the extreme
interdependency between communications and DSS's (given that





Thirdly, from a technological perspective, the
technology now exists (software, hardware, size, weight...)
so that a DSS can be employed in a combat environment.
In view of the aforementioned, I would submit that the
design of DSS for implementation in related situations
e
should focus upon the organizational process view regarding
decisionmaking. Besides accounting for the above factors,
Keen and Scott-Morton assert that effective decisions can be
realized using this approach providing the following are
understood.
1. the formal and informal structure of the organization.
2. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) utilized by the
organization
.
3. Channels of Communications.
For example, they assert that support packages can be
developed for the myriad SOP*s in the military permitting
problem solving procedures to be executed more efficiently
and rapidly.
Additionally, since this approach focuses upon the
relationships among organizational subunits, it also assists
in integrating their activities.
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For illustrative purposes, implementation of a DSS of
related design could have reduced the frequency of occurence
of Category I communication errors, and rendered effective
decisions for the task at hand. As an example, the decision
to send a reconaissance patrol on a mission without proper
fire support (due to inablity to communicate) could have
been prevented by ensuring the activities of the artillery
and ground units were fully integrated through use of an
"event triggering" DSS capability (i.e. exception type
reporting) . Communications Officers sharing the same DSS
resources however, could have been alerted as to the
discrepancy, and corrected it by informing the individual
unit commanders at the pre-operational brief.
1 . Disadvantages
1. Educational/Skill level - requires trained
operators.
2. Vulnerability - elimination/incapacitation of a
few "nodes" (skilled operators, pieces of equipment)
jeopardizes operation of entire system.
3. Duplicity - requirement to maintain backup
system creates financial, maintenance and logistic burden.
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4. Redundancy - in systems as individuals must
remain proficient in former method of operation in case the
DSS is disabled.
5. Inertia - resistance to change (accept DSS)
always a problem.
6. Organizational Impact - overdependence upon the
system by the commander could result in the commander
becoming more remote from his unit leaders and thereby
risking being perceived as a manager as opposed to a leader
(DSS is designed to support versus make decisions by
providing accurate and relevant real time information)
.
7. Leadership Impact - potential exists for
subordinates to perceive a shift in emphasis from a human
oriented, to a hardware oriented (mission) style of
leadership.
8. Human Factors considerations - must be
completely recognized and accounted for to ensure optimal
system design and implementation.
•9 Centralization - that a few will control all
(notion that having access to information constitutes a





1. Time savings - unit commanders receive real-time
information thereby improving the timeliness and quality of
decisions.
2. Personnel savings - a few trained/skilled
operators rsplace superfluous manual laborers.
3. Weight savings - bulky equipment replaced by
"compact" equipment.
4. Space savings - same.
5. Standardization - continuity incorporated into
DSS.
6. Event triggered reponse capability - allows for
more fapid response and relievs staff and special staff
officers of routine duties.
7. Integrates - information shared by subunits.
8. Control - facilitates control or unit resources.





Error analysis revealed that a large number of
nonessential battlefield casualties resulted during the
execution of particular types of operations. Further
analysis disclosed that a significant number of these
casualties could be attributed solely to systematic
communications failures associated with the particular task.
The most important conclusions to be drawn from these
findings are reflected below.
1. Systematic communication errors contributed to a
significant number of nonessential casualties or failed
missions during land combat operations conducted by the USMC
in Vietnam.
2. The majority of errors were nonstructured in nature,
and as such non-DSS supportable. Of these errors, many can
be expected to occur in future engagements, as they were
either attitudinally or behaviorally precipitated. The best
countermeasures to reduce their impact, is the ability to
recognize - and compensate for - those situations where they
are likely to occur.
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3. The remaining errors were considered semi-structured
in nature and as such, are DSS supportable. Implementation
of an effective DSS is however, contingent upon recognizing
the unique tasks, structure, decision points, SOPs and
channels of communication in a military environment. Given
the critical real time constraints associated with military
operations, DSS's would prove themselves especially valuable
if they possessed an "event triggered" capability. Used in
this capacity, they would prove especially useful to Staff
(S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4) and Special Staff (i.e. MMO, CommO)
Officers given the tremendous amount of information they are
required to maintain and process repeatedly. Their use by
individual commanders however is considered neither
practical nor feasible due to:
a. the nature of combat operations
b. image (leader vs.. manager) required to be
projected to subordinates on the battlefield.
It should be recognized that DSS's do not constitute a
panacea with regards to reducing systematic communication
errors inherent in combat operations. What they do
represent however, is a natural and technological
progression in the "tools" (i.e. teletype, radio...)
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designed to assist the commander on the modern battlefield.
As such, the tasks, situations and environment in which
they can be effectively operated must be recognized.
This study identified those tasks and situations (where
an inordinate number of nonessential casualties) in which
the implementation of a DSS could reduce the associated
systematic communication errors (contributing to the
casualties) . It also identified those situations in which
the use of a DSS would have no effect, and as such, the
commander must concentrate his energies on other approaches
(i.e. indoctrination, training...) designed at solving the
problem.
Although this study was limited in its approach, it has
become evident that further analytical work needs to be
accomplished concerning the study of unstructured systematic
communication errors occurring in combat. Even if their
occurrences cannot be prevented, merely identifying those
situations or tasks in which they are likely to occur will
yield tremendous benefits in predicting the consequences and
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